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Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be
Raised
By Robert H. Lande*
The conventional wisdom is that current antitrust damage
levels are too high, lead to overdeterrence, and should be cut back.
Althou~h most agree that threefold damages are fine, at least for
cartels, the combination of treble damages to direct purchasers and
another treble damages to indirect purchasers 2 typically is denounced
as duplicative, a "mess,,,3 or the equivalent of the use of "cluster
bombs" on defendants. 4 This article, however, will assert the
opposite. This article will argue that, if the current antitrust damage
levels are examined carefully, they do not even total treble damages,
and overall are not high enough to deter antitrust violations
optimally.
Perhaps this debate can first start with a point of general
agreement. It cannot reasonably be disputed that the current antitrust
damages system is a confusing, inefficient patchwork. 5 The current
• Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, and
Director and Senior Research Scholar, American Antitrust Institute. The author
would like to thank John Connor, Albert Foer, and Daniel Small for extremely
helpful suggestions, and Caroline Miller for excellent research assistance.
1 Some believe, however, that treble damages should be reserved for per se
violations. See American Bar Association's Antitrust Remedies Task Force
Legislative Proposal, Discussion Draft (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter ABA Discussion
Draft].
2 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) held that only direct
purchasers can sue for damages. Many states, however, subsequently passed state
"Illinois Brick repealer" legislation. See Ronald W. Davis, Indirect Purchaser
Litigation: ARC America's Chickens Come Home To Roost On The Illinois Brick
Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (1997).

3

Davis, supra note 2, at 395.

4 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust In The New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 935
(2001).
5 Professor Spencer Weber Waller termed it "incoherent." See Spencer Weber
Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CmCAGO-I<ENT L. REv.
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system is so illogical that it is easy to ridicule-indeed, no rational
person ever would have designed it from scratch in its current form.
So, it is not a surprise that many call for modification of some of the
existing damages categories, for consolidation, simplification, and
reform. 6
Nevertheless, this article will show that, if it is examined
carefully, the current antitrust "treble" damages remedy really only
constitutes approximately single damages. Even the award of "treble"
damages to both direct and indirect purchasers only equals double
damages. Yet, a multiplier, such as three, is necessary if we are to
deter anticompetitive behavior optimally. Far from being duplicative
or excessive, the current total should be raised.

I. Crucial Questions
Moreover, there are two crucial questions that should be
answered before the current antitrust damages system is changed.
First, is there convincing evidence that, overall, the current
combination of damage and fine levels is too high, that they
constitute effective duplication or lead to overdeterrence?
This article will argue that the answer to this question clearly
is "no." There is no convincing evidence that the aggregate of direct
purchaser damages, indirect purchaser damages, and the like
produces damage levels so high that they have led to real duplication
or overdeterrence.
Of course, lawyers for plaintiffs and defendants can give
anecdotes cutting in different directions. Defendants' lawyers can
point to bad cases that received too much money,? while plaintiffs'
lawyers can point to good cases that were dismissed or received far
too little money. But, anecdotes from interested parties are not proof.
Although I have been searching for more than a decade, 8 I have never
seen anyone analyzing the decisions of neutral finders of fact,
including judges and juries, present a systematic pattern of evidence
207, 209 (2003).
6

See ABA Discussion Draft, supra note 1.

7 Many of these anecdotes are true. Surely there have been many antitrust
cases where the awarded damages were too high and other cases where no damages
whatsoever should have been awarded. See Waller, supra note 5, for a discussion
of possible examples of each type of case.
S I have been searching for this evidence ever since I started work on an earlier
article on damages. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really
Single Damages, 54 OHIO STATE L.J. 115, 161-68 (1993).
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demonstrating that, overall, the current damage levels either
constitute effective duplication or lead to overdeterrence. Moreover,
anyone seeking to change the current system should have the burden
to show that currently there is a problem and that their solution can
help fix this problem. This article will argue that not only has this
burden not been met; if anything, the current overall damages level is
too low.
There is a second question we also should ask: is there any
convincing evidence that any of the reform or simplification ideas
currently being proposed would do so without lowering the overall
amounts awarded?
It is easy to simplify the existing antitrust damages system. If
all we want is a simple, administratively efficient system without any
confusion, complexities, duplication, or legal costs, this can be
accomplished easily. We should repeal all of the antitrust laws.
Suppose, however, we believe that effective antitrust laws are
beneficial for the economy on the whole, and that effective remedies
are necessary to deter future offenses optimally. Also assume this
article is able to show there is no evidence that the total of the
existing damages and fines is duplicative or too large from the
perspective of optimal deterrence. Suppose this article even is able to
show that the overall total should be raised.
Then the issue becomes much more difficult. The goal then
should become to design a damages system that will lead to at least
as much deterrence as that provided currently, and at the same time is
also more efficient, simpler, or saves administrative costs. If one does
not include this deterrence requirement, however, then the ostensible
quest for simplification could really just be a cleverly disguised way
of reducing overall damage levels. 9 And, as noted, this article will

9 See, for example, the first discussion item tentatively promulgated by the
ABA Antitrust Section's Damages Task Force in February 2004. ABA Discussion
Draft, supra note 1. It would create a federal indirect purchaser cause of action by
changing the existing cause of action for direct purchasers into one that allowed for
both direct and indirect purchaser suits, in one action, where the total damages paid
was threefold. It contains a presumption that the indirect purchasers would obtain
the recovery, but the direct purchasers could attempt to overcome this presumption.

If this proposal simply created a new federal damages provision, it would be
desirable. A key question, however, is whether it might implicitly preempt existing
state Illinois Brick repealer legislation. If so, it would have the effect of
significantly lowering the overall deterrence offered by the current combination of
direct and indirect purchaser laws. It would also be much simpler and more
efficient, and mean that indirect purchasers, rather than direct purchasers, would be
more likely to recover.
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argue that this would be an undesirable outcome. If one wants to
design a remedies system that achieves both a high degree of
deterrence and simplicity, this is very difficult to do.
We probably are better off with even a complicated and
flawed damages system that at least provides a moderate level of
deterrence, than with a simpler system that would lead to completely
inadequate deterrence. Moreover, if someone does come up with a
"reform" or "simplification" proposal that is likely to have the effect
of reducing the total damages awarded, we should ameliorate this
downward effect. 10 In fact, we should move in the opposite direction.

Under this proposal, all plaintiffs, combined, in states that currently do not
have an Illinois Brick repealer, would recover the same as they do today in the
aggregate. In these states different purchasers would be likely to recover: the
indirect purchasers would be more likely to recover, instead of the direct purchasers
who recover today. But, the total paid to purchasers in states without Illinois Brick
repealers would not change.
By contrast, in states like California that currently have effective repealers, the
total recovery would decrease dramatically if their laws were preempted. Under the
current situation, nominal treble damages go to direct purchasers, and another
nominal treble damages go to indirect purchasers. But, under this proposal, all
purchasers, together, would only get nominal treble damages. So, for roughly half
the states deterrence would diminish by approximately 50%.
Since deterrence would remain the same in roughly half the states, and be
harmed by 50% in the other half, the overall effect of this proposal would be to
significantly decrease overall deterrence. However, since this article will show in
Part II that the existing "treble damages" are really equal only to single damages,
and are not nearly large enough for optimal deterrence, this is an undesirable result.
An alternative way to view this is from the perspective of settlements, since
most cases in this area settle. Instead of settlements in places like California of, for
example, single damages for direct purchasers and another single damages for
indirect purchasers, the ABA Discussion Draft would mean that there would only
be one settlement, for single damages, which would be likely to go to the indirect
purchasers. And, of course, these damages are only nominal, without adjustments
for prejudgment interest, etc. Rather than raise the overall payouts to achieve
optimal deterrence, this proposal would lower them.

The only ways to be sure that the Discussion Draft would not lead .to a
suboptimal level of deterrence would be to make absolutely certain that it would
not preempt existing state laws, or to amend it in ways that ameliorate its
downward effects on deterrence. For example, it should include a provision for
prejudgment interest and some of the other proposals in infra note 10. As it was
proposed, however, this "reform" or "simplification" proposal is likely to actually
be a clever way to lower effective overall damage levels.
10 Beneficial reform provisions, which are likely to lead to more nearly
optimal deterrence, include the following:
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If this article is able to provide convincing evidence that the existing

damages levels are, overall, too low, then we should devise ways to
raise the existing damages payouts. 11

II. Does Real Duplication or Overdeterrence Exist?
Perhaps the most common criticism of the current system of
multiple enforcers and multiple remedies is that it could lead to
payouts that are more than three times damages, and that this would
constitute duplication and overdeterrence. Many argue that, while
treble damages are fine, the current combination of treble damages
for direct purchasers, plus another three for indirect purchasers, 12 plus
disgorgement, plus the effects of state enforcement actions,13 plus

1. Prejudgment interest should be awarded for direct purchasers,
indirect purchasers, and in criminal fines.
2. The existing four-year Statute of Limitations should be raised to
eight years, the approximate life of the average cartel. See Lande, supra
note 8, at 130-34.
3. Include a provision that antitrust "damages" include the allocative
inefficiency effects of market power, and a presumption that they are Y2
or 'A as large as the transfer effects of market power. However, it might
be appropriate only to permit State Attorneys General to sue for this
damages item.
4. Include a presumption that "umbrella effects" occurred-that prices
rose as much for firms in the relevant market that are not members of
the cartel as they did for cartel members.
5. Provide that damages in class actions shall be figured on a class-wide
basis, with damages awarded in proportion to the ratio of an
individual's purchases or sales to that of the entire class.
6. Every state should enact an effective Illinois Brick repealer. States
with ineffective Illinois Brick repealers should strengthen them.
II

See the suggestions described supra note 10.

12 Indeed, in theory treble damages could be paid to several layers of indirect
purchasers.

13 States are permitted to bring antitrust cases, perhaps due to Federalism
concerns and a separation of powers idea, and perhaps for other reasons as well.
For example, suppose the federal government, for philosophical reasons, decided to
stop suing big businesses for antitrust violations. The states (and private plaintiffs)
could help to fill the void, and would provide a counterbalance that would help
avoid sharp swings in antitrust policy. Second, the federal enforcers' judgment
might be flawed, and a second opinion can be useful. Third, without state enforcers
we would have to increase federal enforcement budgets commensurately, and this
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criminal fines of double the ¥.ain or loss, leads to overall damages of
. sixfold, eightfold, or tenfold. 4
However, the duplication argument is only a theoretical
construct that has never occurred in the real world. I am not aware of
even a single case where a cartel's total payouts have ever exceeded
three times the damages involved-if these damages are figured
properly. This is true because, if one examines antitrust's so-called
"treble" damages remedy carefully, from the perspective of optimal
deterrence, one will find that it is really at most only single
damages. IS The "threefold damages" that the antitrust world takes for
granted is a myth.
The starting place of a fair discussion of the correct overall
level of antitrust damage awards should be the analysis promulgated
by Professor William Landes. 16 Landes convincingly showed that to
·
. 117 deterrence 18 th e damages f rom an antitrust
.
achleve
optima
might not occur. If federal budgets were not increased appropriately, antitrust
enforcement would suffer significantly. Fourth, state enforcers sometimes might be
better attuned to local facts than the federal enforcers. Fifth, from an organizational
perspective, it is desirable to have an enforcement unit specifically protecting the
consumers and economy of a particular state. Otherwise, these concerns could just
get lost despite good intentions by the federal enforcers. For a more extended
discussion of the benefits and costs of state antitrust enforcement see Robert H.
Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State
Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1047 (1990).
14 See, e.g., Michael L. Denger, A New Approach To Cartel Enforcement
Remedies Is Needed, ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting, at 15 (Apr. 24-26, 2002).
15 See Lande, supra note 8. This is just an approximation. This article
calculated that antitrust's "treble" damages remedy probably was actually between
48% and 109% of actual damages. These figures also are just estimates. Id. at 160.
See also Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust At The Tum Of The Twenty-First Century: The
Matter of Remedies, 91 GEO LJ. 169, 171 (2002) ("Studies show that treble
damages really amount approximately to single damages in most circumstances.").
See also Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing In Private Merger Cases:
Reconciling Private Incentives And Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv.
1, n.91 (1995) ("In fact, treble damages turn out to be closer to single damages
when current losses, litigation costs, and future recovery are discounted to present
value."). See also Carlson & Erickson Builders v. Lampert Yards, 190 Wis. 2d
650,667 (1995). For discussions of the deterrence and compensation nature of
treble damages, see, e.g., Lande, supra note 8 (positing that "'treble damages'
actually awarded are probably at most as large as the damages caused by the
violation").
16 William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions For Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 652, 656 (1983).

17 Professor Landes carefully designed his approach so that it would not be too
strict or too lenient. His goal was not to deter all violations. He only wanted to
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violation should be equal to the violation's "net harm to others,"
multiplied by the probability of detection and proof. 19 This
framework is almost universally accepted, even by those who are not
of a Chicago School orientation. 2o
The multiplier used in calculating antitrust damages should be
larger than one because not all violations are detected and proven. 21
From the perspective of optimal deterrence, if damages and fines
only total actual damages, firms would be undeterred from
committing violations. For this reason most agree that there should be
some kind of multiplier. If we only catch and successfully prosecute
1/3 of all cartels, for example, then threefold damages are appropriate
to achieve optimal deterrence. 22 Of course, no one knows whether we
catch more or less than 113 of all antitrust violations. 23 But, since a
deter violations when so doing would be efficient, and he wanted to permit efficient
breaches of the antitrust laws. Id.
18 Professor Landes did not analyze compensation of victims. Even if we were
concerned with compensation, however, it would make little difference in the
outcome. See Lande, supra note 8, at 161-68. Moreover, there is widespread
agreement over the need optimally to deter future violations, while the
compensation argument is more controversial.

Currently, direct purchasers are compensated even if they pass some or most of
the overcharges to their own customers. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). Indirect purchasers, however, only are compensated if
their state has an effective Illinois Brick repealer.
19

See Landes, supra note 16, at 666-68.

20

See Lande, supra note 8 and accompanying text.

21 "Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for would-be
violators when unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted successfully. Indeed,
some multiplication is necessary even when most of the liability-creating acts are
open and notorious. The defendants may be able to conceal facts that are essential
to liability." Frank Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. ECON. 445,
455 (1985).
22 If a cartel overcharges by $1.00, but there is less than a one-in-three chance
that it will be caught and convicted, then it would be rational for the cartel to
attempt to break the law unless the penalty is $3.00 or more. A full analysis of the
issue, however, becomes very complicated. See Landes, supra note 16.
23 Some might argue that there currently is overdeterrence-that today almost
every anticompetitive cartel is caught and successfully prosecuted, and the current
damage actions mean that innocent companies are being harassed and almost
blackmailed by unscrupulous plaintiffs. For an insightful discussion of this issue,
see Jonathan B. Baker, New Horizons in Cartel Detection, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
824 (2001). If this were true, then a lower damages level would be appropriate.

The continued high number of Department of Justice ("DOl") grand juries
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multiplier of more than 1 is appropriate, and no one can demonstrate
that antitrust should instead use a multiplier of 2 or 4, we usually
assume, without much evidence,24 that only 113 of all cartels are
indicates, however, that a lot of cartels still exist. As of February 2004, the DOJ
had approximately 100 pending gmnd jury investigations, 50 of which involved
suspected international cartel activity. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATUS REpORT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST
DIVISION'S
CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM
(2004),
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/202531.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
The DOJ and a large number of gmnd juries clearly believe there are a lot of cartels
that still exist. Between 1993 and 2002, the DOJ opened from 19 to 51 grand jury
investigations per year, most of which resulted in convictions. ANTITRUST DIV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 1991-2002, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/12848.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004). The
following table shows the DOl's success in prosecuting antitrust violations:

Total
Criminal
Cases

1993

'94

'95

'96

'97

'98

'99

2000

'01

'02

Filed

84

57

60

42

38

62

57

63

44

33

Won

73

51

65

38

40

64

48

52

38

37

Lost

3

4

2

5

1

1

2

-

2

1

Pending

-

-

-

-

-

17

24

35

39

34

Appeal
Decisions

7

9

7

6

4

6

-

-

5

1

[d.
If there had been little or no effective price fixing during this period, the DOJ
has been fooling a lot of gmnd juries, judges, and juries. During the last four years,
over 80 years of imprisonment have been imposed on antitrust offenders, with more
than 30 defendants receiving jail sentences of one year or longer. ANTITRUST DIV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATUS REpORT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
(2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelineS/202531.htm (last visited Apr.
27, 2004). In 2002 defendants in cases prosecuted by the Antitrust Division were
sentenced to a record number of jail days, more than 10,000 in all. [d. In 2003, the
avemge jail sentence reached a record high of 21 months. /d.
24 In 1986 the Assistant Attorney Geneml for Antitrust, Douglas Ginsburg,
estimated that the enforcers catch less than 10% of all cartels. See United States
Sentencing Commission: Unpublished Public Hearings, 1986 volume, at 15 (July
15,1986 Hearing). If he is correct, damages for cartels should be tenfold! However,
the percentage of cartels that are caught and proven probably is much higher today.
See Gary R. Spmtling, Detection and Deterrence, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 798,
817-23 (2001). There is, however, no evidence that it exceeds 1/3, so there is no
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detected and proven, and therefore, a multiplier of 3 is appropriate. 25
Optimal damages therefore are assumed to be equal to the net harm to
others times 3.
This, of course, leads to the question-what are the "net
harms to others" from, for example, a cartel? These harms include the
wealth transferred from consumers to the cartel caused by market
power-which is, of course, the measure of damages in treble
damages actions. But many other factors should also be included.
First, damages should be adjusted for the time value of
money. There is extensive data which suggests that the average cartel
probably lasts 7-8 years, with an additional 4 plus year lag before
judgment.26 Taking this factor into account, by itself, probably means
that so-called "treble" damages are really only approximately double
damages. 27
The allocative inefficiency harms from market power-the
deadweight loss welfare triangle 28-are a second "net harm to others"
reason to believe that the treble damages remedy should be lowered. See Lande,
supra note 8, at 115 n.1.
25 Few quarrel with three as the multiplier for cartel cases. Some would,
however, lower the multiplier for rule of reason cases. See ABA Discussion Draft,
supra note 1.

26

See Lande, supra note 8, at 130-34.

27 /d. at 134-36. These calculations showed that for 1972-1991, a period of
relatively high inflation, this factor alone meant that "treble damages" were really
only between 1.65 and 1.25 times actual damages. However, today's lower interest
rates would produce a lower adjustment.
28 The reason why monopoly power causes a suboptimal use of societal
resources is relatively straightforward:

To raise prices a monopoly reduces output from the competitive level.
The goods no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers than
they would cost society to produce. This foregone production of goods
worth more than their cost is pure social loss and constitutes the
"allocative inefficiency" of monopoly. For example, suppose that
widgets cost $1.00 in a competitive market (their cost of production
plus a competitive profit). Suppose a monopolist would sell them for
$2.00. A potential purchaser who would have been willing to pay up to
$1.50 will not purchase at the $2.00 level. Because a competitive
market would have sold the widgets for less than they were worth to
him, the monopolist's reduced production has decreased the
consumer's satisfaction without producing any countervailing benefits
for anyone. This pure loss is termed "allocative inefficiency."
Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of
Antitrust, 33 ANTrrRUST BULL. 429,433-34 n.17 (1988). See also E. MANSFIELD,
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from cartels. 29 Yet, they apparently have never been awarded in an
antitrust case. 30 This omission is significant. To oversimplify, Judge
Frank Easterbrook made a number of standard assumptions and
calculated that, due to the omission from damage awards of this
factor alone, "'[t]reble damages' are really ~only] double the starting
point of overcharge plus allocative loss .... " I
Third, the umbrella effects of market p,0wer are another
virtually unawarded damage from market power. 2 For example, the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") never
produced even 70% of the free world's supply of oi1. 33 Yet, when
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 277-92 (4th ed. 1982) (providing
an extended discussion and formal proof that monopoly pricing creates allocative
inefficiency).
29 See Lande, supra note 8, at 119-21. "[I]f the measure of liability is the
excess of the monopoly price over the competitor price, times the number of units
sold, it is necessary to include some multiplier in order to bring the allocative
welfare costs of the violation home to the violator. Extracting the overcharge is not
enough; the penalty must induce the putative offender to compare the allocative
loss against any gains in productive efficiency, and that occurs when the sanction
includes the full measure of the allocative loss." Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 455.
30 See David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages For
Consumer Welfare Loss, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 505 (1991). I am unaware of either
a more recent article on the subject or any case where plaintiff has received
damages for the allocative inefficiency harms of market power.

31 Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 455. Judge Easterbrook's standard, yet
simplified assumptions might, however, have resulted in too large an estimate. As
he notes:

In the simple'case of linear demand and supply curves, the allocative
loss is half the monopoly overcharge, so a multiplier of 1.5 is in order.
These curves doubtless are not linear, but legal rules must be derived
from empirical guesses rather than exhaustive investigation. The
multiplier of 1.5 thus may be a rough approximation of the lower
bound. It takes care of the fact the nonbuyers do not recover
damages. A further multiplier is necessary to handle the improbability
of proving liability. As uncertainty and the difficulty of prosecution
increase, so should the multiplier. From the violator's perspective,
"treble" damages really are double the starting point of overcharge plus
allocative loss, and thus trebling the overcharge is appropriate when the
change of finding and successfully prosecuting a violation is one in
two.
/d. at 454-55.
32 See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW para. 337.3
(Supp. 1992) for a discussion.
33

See MOHAMMED E AHRARI, OPEC: THE FAILING GIANT 203 (1986).
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OPEC raised prices, prices also increased for the oil sold by noncartel members. 34 Moreover, the price of fuels that were partial
substitutes for oil, such as coal, uranium, and natural gas, also rose. 35
The so-called "treble damages" multiplier should be adjusted for this
factor as well to account for the net harms to others from
.
. .
..
36
antIcompetItI ve actIvIty.
Moreover, there are five more adjustments to the so-called
"treble damages" multiplier that should be made to calculate the net
harms to others from an antitrust violation?? These eight adjustments,
combined, show that even those cases that supposedly award "treble
damages" probably only really award damages equal to, at most, one
times the actual harms caused by the violation. 38 As noted, however,
from the perspective of optimal deterrence damages really should be
at the threefold level. For this reason this article is titled, "Why
Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised."

III. Other Considerations
Most damage cases are settled by negotIatIOn, with the
plaintiffs, of course, asking for "treble damages.,,39 However, the
analysis in Part II demonstrates that the starting point for these
negotiations is only 1/3 as high as it should be. Instead of starting at
real treble damages and negotiating down to, for example, single
damages, the parties have actually been starting at roughly single
damages and then negotiating down to perhaps only 1/3 of the
violation's true damages. For this reason most settlements lead to
inadequate deterrence.
34

Id.

35 See GEORGE L. PERRY, THE UNITED STATES, IN HIGHER OIL PRICES AND
THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM 102 (Edward R. Fried &
Charles L. Schultze eds., 1975).
36 It probably would be practical, however, only to account for allocative
inefficiency occurring within the relevant market that is the subject of the antitrust
violation.
37 The omitted five factors are: (1) effects of the Statute of Limitations; (2)
uncompensated plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs; (3) the uncompensated value
of plaintiffs time spent pursuing the case; (4) the costs of the judicial system; and
(5) tax effects. See Lande, supra note 8, at 129-158.

38

Id. at 158-60.

39 Very few antitrust damages actions result in a verdict. See John M. Connor
& Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices: Implications For Reform
Of The Sentencing Guidelines (2004) (draft article, on file with the author).
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Some antitrust violations also result in criminal fines. 4o If
these were added to the totals from the private damages actions, the
actual overall level of payouts would rise dramatically,41 but would
still rarely reach the true threefold level. 42 The criminal penalties
imposed almost always utilize the statutory maximum of "twice the
gross gain or twice the gross 10ss,,,43 which the DOl almost always
approximates as 20% of the defendant's affected sales instead of
double the actual gain or 10ss.44 However, the supposed standard of
20% of defendant's affected sales often is negotiated downwards
substantially,45 and is not adjusted to present value. 46 Nevertheless,
including criminal fines of double the actual gains or losses could
raise the effective deterrent on hard core cartels from a nominal three
or six (if damages to both direct and indirect purchasers were
awarded) up to as much as a nominal eightfold damages. 47 This
40 See generally Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter
and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 693 (2001).
41 In addition, many per se and rule of reason antitrust cases do not lead to
criminal fines. This analysis, however, ignores the deterrent effects of jail
sentences, which can sometimes be significant.
42 This conclusion only considers the costs and benefits to the cartel that occur
within the United States. International considerations would complicate the
analysis. There is no foreign regime with damage and fine provisions as tough as
those of the United States. Moreover, if European fines were considered as a cost to
the cartel, then in fairness we also should include the overcharges to European
consumers. Doing this would make the total underdeterrence even greater for
international cartels. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors Darren Bush, et aI.,
Empagran, SA v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. (Mar. 15, 2004) (No. 03-724),
available at 2004 WL 533933.
43 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1994). Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency and
Amnesty, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 715, 724 (2001).·
44

Kobayashi, supra note 43, at 720-721.

45

Id. at 724-25.

46 Id. at 722-28. See also 18 U.S.c. § 3571(d); Spratling, supra note 24, at
803-08. See generally Baker, supra note 40.

47 One even could ask why we do not just use criminal sanctions and other
federal prosecutions. This also brings up the issue of the extent to which we trust
"big brother" in Washington to take care of us. The DOJ's dramatic shift in the
Microsoft case under the Bush administration to a stance that was far less
aggressive illustrates how political antitrust prosecutions sometimes can be.
Moreover, the Clinton administration initiated the programs that are leading to
huge fines against large international companies. See Baker, supra note 40, at 70001. Who can predict what future administrations will do? In addition, criminal
antitrust violations must, of course, be proven to a much more stringent standard.
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figure should then be adjusted downward by the factors discussed
earlier, however, which would bring the true total down to
approximately treble damages.
Considering the necessary adjustments, however, I have never
heard of even a single example of a cartel really paying more than
threefold damages and fines in tota1. 48 Moreover, I have never even
heard of a single example of a cartel paying even true treble damages.
I challenge the reader to produce even a single real world example of
the sixfold or eightfold damages of lore! But, the catch is that a
neutral party-a judge, a jury, or an administrative agency-should
be the one to conclude that the damages were actually sextuple or
octuple. Defense lawyers almost always assert that their clients never
raised prices, so even a $1 settlement would constitute an infinite
ratio of damages to actual injury.49 But plaintiffs would, of course,
We want anticompetitive actions deterred optimally even if we are not sure enough
to put someone in jail.
48 Even the cartels that have paid the most in history-the Vitamin cartelshave paid less than one times their overcharges in damages and fines total, and this
does not even adjust for lack of prejudgment interest. See Brief of Amici Curiae of
Professors Darren Bush, et al. at 4, Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd.
(Mar. 15, 2(04) (No. 03-724) ("This research demonstrates that the international
vitamin cartel generated the largest total of antitrust fmes and penalties in history,
which are calculated to be between $4.4 and $5.6 billion. But the cartel's monopoly
profits in all areas of the world were $9 to $13 billion."), available at 2004 WL
533933.

Not surprisingly, others disagree with this conclusion. Professor Waller
calculated that for the total of damages and fines, for both the United States and
abroad, "the total ratio of punishment to harm begins to approach seven to one.
Even adjusted for the lack of prejudgment interest [and the other factors noted in
Lande, supra note 8] .... one is likely to end with a ratio of substantially higher
than three to one." Waller, supra note 5, at 221-25. The amicus brief, however,
used more recent information.
Defendants no doubt would assert that still a different ratio was appropriate.
But, the crucial point is that no judge, jury, or other neutral fact finder has ever
found facts that support the assertion that the total payouts in the vitamins cartels
exceeded three times its damages.
49 Under this view many or most private cases are rent-seeking blackmail
involving greedy, unscrupulous plaintiff lawyers. Surely this does occur, and many
people can give examples that, in their opinion, qualify as "legalized blackmail."
Although judges are supposed to prevent this from occurring, they often lack the
resources or expertise to identify these situations. Anecdotes from non-neutral
parties, however, are not proof of a pattern.

Out of fairness, moreover, a counter-anecdote might be instructive. The
NASDACQ class action litigation settled for $1.027 billion, plus interest, which
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make very different assertions. Respectfully, defendants (like
plaintiffs) are not neutral sources. 50
This same challenge has been issued in many public fora to
many defense lawyers over the years, but none has ever been able to
name even one real case involving actual damage levels that
exceeded the threefold level for a cartel or monopoly. Yet, only a
pattern of such evidence might justify damages reform that lowered
the overall levels of antitrust damages.
Instead, the following scenario is more typical. Assuming that
plaintiff can get the class certified, defendants might negotiate a
settlement with direct purchasers of, say, nominal single damages.
They might also negotiate a settlement with indirect purchasers (from
many of the 25 or so states that permit indirect purchaser suits) that

was distributed to more than a million class members. According to plaintiffs'
attorney, this represented roughly single damages. The total of attorneys' fees,
litigation expenses, class notice costs, and settlement administration expenses was
$131 million. Payments to victims totaled $896 million in cash, not coupons or
discounts. This was 87% of the total settlement. Atypically, this was a case where
the private plairitiffs took the lead and the government followed. There would have
been no deterrence, no compensation, and no beneficial future effects on the
market, if not for the actions of the plaintiffs and their lawyers. See Arthur M.
Kaplan, Antitrust As A Public-Private Partnership: A Case Study a/the NASDACQ
Litigation, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 111, 129 (2001).
For an overview of "numerous scenarios in which defendants that engaged in
illegal activity receive no punishment whatsoever for their conduct" see Waller,
supra note 5, at 230-33.
50 How might some respond to my challenge to provide even a single cartellet alone a pattern of cases-where the total effective overall payouts have
exceeded three times the damages caused by the cartel? They might say the
following, which the author has heard in a variety of forms from defendant counsel
on many occasions: "My clients did not try to fix prices, and even if they tried, they
never succeeded, and at least not in an effective way. The cartel failed to affect
price levels because effective collusion is so difficult in our industry. I have an
economist who will so testify (in fact, I have several). It is true that we settled the
case for millions or even hundreds of millions of dollars, but we did this just to
avoid a crazy judge and/or jury. Therefore, in my case the real, effective mUltiplier
was much more than three. In fact, it was infinity because, as I already told you, we
did not affect price levels at all."

There is, of course, a crucial problem with this argument. These are only the
opinions of defense counsel, not of judges or juries. Respectfully, we cannot just
take their word for their assertions. This is especially true when their clients were
sent to jail for price fixing. Moreover, we know that some of their clients keep
trying to fix prices, risking significant jail terms, fines, and private damages
actions. Are these otherwise rational business people crazy? Or is collusion often
profitable?

2004]

Raising Antitrust Damage Levels

343

aggregate to no more than V2 of actual nationwide damages. To this
should be added the criminal fines that, for a cartel, often are
negotiated down to 1 or 1Y2 times the supposed damages. 51 These
appear to total roughly treble damages for the cartel: 1 & Y2 & (l or
1Y2) = roughly 3. However, after adjustments are made for lack of
prejudgment interest and the other factors described earlier, the
effective total is likely to be much less than treble damages. Indeed, it
certainly is not sixfold or eightfold, and probably only is single
damages.
Thus, the "duplication" or "overdeterrence" argument is only
theoretical. No proponent of antitrust damages "reform" has ever
cited a real world example. A fortiori, there is no reason to think that
a pattern of such cases exists. However, true treble damages, even for
rule of reason cases, 52 should be our goal. Accordingly, this article is
titled, "Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised."
51

See sources cited supra notes 23, 24, and 46 and accompanying text.

52 It has sometimes been proposed that damages should be detrebled for rule
of reason violations. See, e.g., ABA Discussion Draft, supra note 1. Such a regime,
however, would lead to less deterrence then currently exists. It would also be more
complicated and lead to less business certainty in light of the current uncertain line
between per se and rule of reason antitrust violations.

The rationale behind this proposal might be the idea that per se violations are
much more likely to be anticompetitive than rule of reason cases, and that
overdeterrence is much less of a serious risk for per se cases. See generally Baker,
supra note 23. This surely is true. However, if rule of reason situations lead to
antitrust violations and they also cause harms in addition to their transfer effectsthey are likely to cause allocative inefficiency and umbrella effects, they should be
adjusted to present value, etc. So, a multiplier is still appropriate for rule of reason
situations.
The multiplier of three is used, presumably, because antitrust violations
frequently are hard to detect and prove to be anticompetitive. Rule of reason cases
on average probably are easier to detect, but they are much, much harder to prove
than per se cases. There is therefore no reason why the same overall multiplier
should not be used.
One could even make a respectable argument that treble damages are more
important in rule of reason cases. Treble damages probably were adopted in part to
provide an incentive for private litigants to find and prove violations. Lande, supra
note 8, at 122-29. Rule of reason cases are tremendously risky, protracted, and
expensive. Abolishing treble damages in rule of reason cases could effectively
destroy rule of reason private antitrust enforcement. The number of monopolization
cases, vertical cases, etc. could decrease tremendously.
Moreover, treble damages lead to greater attention by firms to the possible
antitrust consequences of their actions. This leads to fewer violations. Even if
"treble damages," when examined properly, are really single damages, if a firm
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IV. Conclusions
Most of the antitrust community concedes that damages
should be trebled to achieve optimal deterrence, but then laments that
the combination of threefold damages to direct purchasers and
another treble damages to indirect purchasers is excessive. This
conclusion, however, is based upon a myth. Antitrust's so-called
"treble" damages are really only single damages. Even if a case
actually yielded "treble" damage payouts to both direct and indirect
purchasers, when viewed correctly this would be the equivalent of
overall payouts that did not reach the threefold level.
This article is not asserting that the current antitrust damages
system is perfect or even that it is logical. Nor is this article
defending every antitrust verdict in every individual case; surely,
many are unjustified or excessive. This article started, moreover, by
admitting that the current system is inefficient. The antitrust
community should, of course, attempt to devise ways to make it
simpler, more efficient, and more equitable. But, it must also make
sure that the quest for "reform" is not a clever subterfuge or
marketing device for a plan to lower the overall damages levels.
In the name of "reform," we should raise the overall antitrust
damage levels, not lower them. In reality, today the total damages
plus fines paid by cartels and monopolies never exceed three. More
often, the real effective total is only singlefold damages or less. In
light of the fact that the current damages starting points are too low,
the burden should be on those who propose reforms to demonstrate
that their proposals would not cut back the overall award levels.
Damage reform proponents should first have to demonstrate that their
proposal will not lower the overall level of damages awarded. Only
then could their proposal be considered an honest simplification or
efficiency proposal.
The current illogical and inefficient system of damages should
thinks they might have to pay treble damages, this could deter them from engaging
in anticompetitive conduct. Single damages combined with an unknown and
uncertain, but significantly less than 100% probability of detection and litigation
would provide a positive incentive to violate the law.
Moreover, criminal penalties are irrelevant in rule of reason cases, so the
private payouts have to supply all the necessary deterrence. In per se cases, by
be supplied by the criminal penalties.
contrast, some of the optimal deterrence

:vill

Instead of lowering damages for rule of reason cases, we should keep damages
at three for rule of reason cases, and raise the levels for per se cases-so that
damage awards in per se cases truly are trebled. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text (providing suggestions on how this could be accomplished).
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of course be reformed. But, we also should be sure not to lower its
overall levels. In fact, if we are truly interested in deterring antitrust
violations optimally, we should raise them.

***

